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Live, Human-made Bacteria As Patentable 
Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. 5 101: Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty 
For 200 years federal courts have generally interpreted 
broadly Congress' power to grant patents.' However, because 
patent law is of statutory origin: for an invention to be patenta- 
ble it must fit into one of the four categories listed in 35 U.S.C. 
section 101:3 process,' machine," manufacture: or composition of 
matter? The Supreme Court has held that these categories do 
1. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power "[tlo promote the Pro- 
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, 
cl. 8. 
In Kendal v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1858) the Supreme Court stated 
that "[tlhe true policy and ends of the patent laws . . . [contemplated and necessarily 
implied] their extensions, and increasing adaptation to the uses of society." Later the 
Court emphasized that courts "should not read into the patent laws limitations and con- 
ditions which the legislature haid] not expressed." United States v. Dubilier Condensor 
Corp., 289 U.S. 178,199 (1933). The very justification for the existence of the patent laws 
was seen to lie in their ability "to serve the ends of science-to push back the frontiers of 
chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowl- 
edge." Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
2. In re McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Markey, C.J., concurring). 
3. Section 101 provides as follows: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and use- 
ful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful im- 
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require- 
ments of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
4. A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given 
result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be 
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is 
just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, 
it is an art. 
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). 
5. "The term machine includes every mechanical device or combination of mechani- 
cal powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result." 
Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853). 
6. " 'Manufacture,' as well defined by the Century Dictionary, is 'the production of 
articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, 
qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.' " Ameri- 
can Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1930). 
7. "This phrase [composition of matter] covers all compositions of two or more sub- 
stances and includes all composite articles, whether they be results of chemical union, or 
of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powers or solids." Shell Dev. Co. 
v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279,280 (D.D.C. 1957), afd, 252 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The 
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not include certain "products of nature" such as mathematical 
formulae, ideas, or laws of nature.' Nevertheless, Congress in 
1930 enacted a bill stating that most asexually reproducing 
plants are patentable even though they might be considered 
products of nature.@ The Supreme Court recently expanded the 
area of live, patentable subject matter by holding in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty that "a live, human-made microorganism" is a 
manufacture or a composition of matter and therefore patenta- 
ble under 35 U.S.C. section 101.l0 
Using a process of plasmid migration, Ananda Chakrabarty 
produced a strain of bacteria capable of metabolizing the hydro- 
carbons that constitute crude oil.ll In 1972 he filed for a patent 
on this invention." The patent application contained three 
types of claims: (1) claims for the method of producing the bac- 
teria, (2) claims for the bacteria mixed with a carrier material 
such as straw and (3) claims for the bacteria themselve~.~~ The
patent examiner allowed the f i s t  two types of claims but re- 
jected the claims for the bacteria themselves on the ground that 
these claims were "drawn to a thing occurring in nature that is 
substantially unaltered and thus nonstatutory subject matter 
[under 35 U.S.C. section 101]."14 
Supreme Court adopted this definition in the instant case. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
8. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71,72 (1972)(mathematical formula); 
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)(ideas); O'Reilly v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 120 (1853)(electromagnetism). 
9. Plant Patent Act, ch. 312,46 Stat. 376 (1930)(current version at  35 U.S.C. $8 161- 
164 (1976)). Tuber-propagated plants, although asexually reproducing, were excluded 
from patent protection. Id. 
10. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305, 310 (1980). The Court's use of the 
term "human-made" may be confusing. Ananda Chakrabarty did not create life. He 
merely inserted previously existing plasmids into certain existing bacteria to endow the 
bacteria with the capability to degrade oil, an abiity they previously had not possess&. 
A better term would be "genetically altered." 
11. The four main hydrocarbons that constitute crude oil are n-octane, camphor, 
salicylate, and naphthalene. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
12. The question of whether the bacteria were patentable did not affect the fact that 
they were an invention: "It is time to settle the point that the terms invent, inventor, 
[and] inventive . . . are unrelated to deciding whether the statutory requirements for 
patentability . . . have been met  There is always an invention; the issues is [sic] its 
patentability." In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962 (C.C.P.A. 1979)(emphasis in original). 
13. Patent Application of Ananda M. Chakrabarty (June 7,1972), reprinted in Peti- 
tioner's Brief for Certiorari app., a t  40-77, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
14. Letter from Patent EInminer to Ananda Chakrabarty (January 11, 1974), re- 
printed in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at  1% 
The Court incorrectly said that the examiner also rejected the application on the 
ground that living things were not patentable subject matter. 447 U.S. a t  306. See In re 
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On appeal the Patent Office Board of Appeals (POBA) re- 
versed the examiner's finding that the bacteria were an unal- 
tered product of nature. Nevertheless, the POBA affirmed the 
examiner's rejection of the claims for the bacteria themselves on 
the ground that living things simply are not patentable subject 
matter under section 101.15 
At the next level of review, the Court of Customs and Pat- 
ent Appeals (CCPA) reversed the POBA's decision relying on 
the authority of its holding in In re Bergy that in patent law 
there is no significance to the fact that the subject matter sought 
to be patented is alive.16 When the Supreme Court later re- 
manded Bergy17 for further consideration in light of Parker v. 
Flook,18 a case holding that an algorithm1@ is unpatentable, the 
CCPA vacated its earlier decision in Chakrabarty and recalled it 
for the same reconsideration the court would give Bergy.'O After 
reconsidering the cases and finding that Flook shed no light on 
them, the CCPA afbmed its earlier decision to grant 
Chakrabarty's patent claims." The Commissioner of Patents ap- 
pealed to the Supreme Court? 
The issue presented to the Supreme Court in the instant 
case was whether "a live, human-made microorganism [was] pat- 
entable subject matter under [the patent ~ta tute] ."~~ In its opin- 
ion the Court noted that the broad constitutional power to grant 
patents given to Congress was intended to foster "a positive ef- 
fed on society through the introduction of new products and 
processes of manufacture into the economy."u The Court rea- 
soned that the meanings of manufacture and composition of 
matter as used by Congress in the patent statute were expansive, 
Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 971 (C.C.P.A. 
1979). 
15. The POBA based its rejection on the legislative history of the Plant Patent Act 
of 1930 that provides patent protection for most asexually reproducing plants. Peti- 
tioner's Brief for Certiorari at 159a-64a 
16. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 
40, 43 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
17. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978)(mem.). 
18. 437 U.S. 584 (1977). 
19. The Court defined an algorithm as a procedure for solving a given type of math- 
ematical problem. Id. at 585 n.1. 
20. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
21. Id. at 967, 987. 
22. Parker v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 924 (1979)(mem.). 
23. 447 U.S. at 305. 
24. Id. at 307 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Oil Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 
(1974)). 
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especially in view of Congress' use in that statute of a compre- 
hensive "any" to modify the terms." The Court found that this 
interpretation was supported by the legislative history of the 
1952 codification of the patent laws, which showed that Congress 
intended the subject matter of section 101 to "include anything 
under the sun that is made by man."26 The Court contrasted 
Chakrabarty's altered bacteria with the newly discovered but 
unaltered bacteria in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant 
CO.~' The Court found that in Chakrabarty no natural phenome- 
non had been claimed as in Funk, but a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter-a product of man having 
a distinctive name, character, and use.a8 
One of the Commissioner's main arguments against the pat- 
entability of microorganisms was based on the Plant Patent Act 
of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. The 1930 
Act explicitly stated that most asexually reproducing plants 
were patentable, but did not mention bacteria? The 1970 Act 
provided protection for new varieties of sexually reproducing 
plants but specifically excluded bacteria?O It was argued that 
the omission or exclusion of bacteria from these statutes indi- 
cated that Congress did not intend for bacteria to be patentable 
in the absence of specific legislation. The Court, however, re- 
fused to view these acts as evidence that other living things not 
25. 447 U.S. at  308. The Court cautioned, however, that such comprehensive lan- 
guage could not include certain phenomena or laws of nature. Id. at  309. 
26. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. 
No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (195l)(statement of P.J. 
Federico); H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 6; S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5, reprinted in [I9521 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394, 2399. 
27. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). Mr. Bond patented a mixture of six strains of certain spe- 
cies of bacteria used to infect the roots of leguminous plants, thus enabling the plants to 
take nitrogen from the air for conversion to organic nitrogenous compounds. Unlike 
other strains of these same species of bacteria, the new strains did not exhibit a mutually 
inhibitive effect and were, therefore, more effective in infecting the plants. Id. at  129-30. 
Therefore, the Court there found that the patentee had merely discovered "the 
handiword of nature" and held that the patent was invalid. Id. at 131. Note, however, 
that if living things were absolutely unpatentable there would have been no need for the 
Funk Court to have made any distinction based on the properties of the bacteria 
concerned. 
28. 447 U.S. at  309-10. 
29. Plant Patent Act, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (1930)(current version at 35 U.S.C. $9 
161-164 (1976)). 
30. 7 U.S.C. $5 2402-2583 (1976). "The breeder of any novel variety of sexually re- 
producing plant (other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so re- 
produced the variety, . . . shall be entitled to plant variety protection therefor . . . . " 
Id. at  $ 2402(a). 
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specifically included were automatically excluded from being 
manufactures or compositions of matter, and, therefore, from 
being patentable subject matter. The Court instead reasoned 
that these acts merely refuted the long held assumptions that 
plants could not adequately be described as required under then 
existing law, and that patents could not be granted for plants, 
even if they were new varieties, when they were reproduced by 
operation of nature? The Court also rejected the idea that Con- 
gress had made any distinction between patentable and nonpat- 
entable inventions based on the presence or absence of life and 
emphasized that the true congressional intent merely recognized 
a "relevant distinction . . . between products of nature, whether 
living or not, and human-made  invention^."^^ The Court rea- 
soned that the 1970 Act was enacted to extend patent protection 
to sexually reproducing plants, all of which had been excluded 
from patent protection by the 1930 Act because in 1930 such 
new plant varieties could not be reproduced true-to-type? Since 
Congress had given no explanation for the exclusion of bacteria 
31. 447 U.S. at 311-12. 
It may be doubted whether a valid patent can be granted for a plant even 
if it is a new variety, when that plant is reproduced by operation of nature, 
aided only by the act of the patentee in grafting it by the usual methods, and a 
very serious question arises as to whether the definition given to the words 
"invention" and "discovery" in the proviso in the bill, namely that they shall 
be interpreted "in the sense of finding a thing already existing and reproducing 
the same as well as in the sense of creating," does not go beyond the power 
which the Constitution grants to Congress. Under the proviso the person who 
is given the right to get a patent, if the found variety is new, has done nothing 
whatever in any way toward creating that variety. 
. . a .  
Further, and more important, there at once arises the difficulty of defining 
in a written document . . . constituting part of the patent . . ., the differences 
which identify a new variety from previously known varieties. 
Plant Patents: Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 6, 7 (1930)(letter from Thomas E. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents). 
The general patent law does not permit grant of a valid patent on a so- 
called "product of nature," since no inventive act can be presumed. Plants 
found in an uncultivated state cannot be presumed to have been created by 
other than nature. 
Prior to the Plant Patent Act, this doctrine barred the patenting of plants. 
Patent Law Revision: Hearing on S. 2, S. 1042, S. 1377, S. 2164, S. 2597 Before the 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., part 2, 790 (1968)(statement of Donald G. Daus). 
32. 447 U.S. at 313. 
33. Id. The Court is incorrect in saying that the 1970 Act extended patent protec- 
tion to sexually reproducing plants. The 1970 Act was not a patent law. S. REP. NO. 91- 
1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). The dissent made this same error. See 447 U.S. at 
320 & n.5, 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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from the 1970 Act? the Court found no clear indication that 
Congress had focused on the issue and therefore found no basis 
for modifying the plain meaning of the words Congress used in 
section 101. 
The dissent rejected the majority's analysis of the legisla- 
tive history of the plant acts and said that the Court should not 
extend patent protection "further than Congress has pro- 
vided."" Contending that Congress had felt it necessary to enact 
specific legslation to create patent protection for plants, the dis- 
sent maintained that Congress could not have intended other 
living things also to be patentable without further specific legis- 
lation. The dissent also argued that under the majority's analy- 
sis plants would have been patentable without the 1930 and 
1970 Acts, which were therefore arguably superfluous legislation. 
Noting that bacteria had been explicitly excluded from the 
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 and reasoning that this 
demonstrated Congress' intent that bacteria not be included 
"within the scope of patent protection," the dissent found the 
majority's interpretation of the plant acts unpersuasive. The dis- 
sent argued, "Congress, assuming that animate objects as to 
which it had not specifically legislated could not be patented, 
excluded bacteria from the set of patentable  organism^."^^ 
Although the facts of the instant case warrant the Court's 
particular holding that genetically altered bacteria are patenta- 
ble subject matter, the Court unnecessarily failed to follow the 
reasoning established in its prior decisions and thus made an un- 
warranted alteration in the definitions of what can be patented. 
Chakrabarty presented the Court with a question of first im- 
pression-whether a live, genetically altered microorganism was 
patentable under section 101 of the patent statute. This inquiry 
actually presented two questions that should be considered sep- 
arately. First, whether a genetically altered microorganism fits 
the literal definition of any category of patentable subject mat- 
ter under section 101. Second, if the altered microorganism does 
fit the definition, whether it nevertheless is unpatentable be- 
34. 447 U.S. at 313, 321. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 7; S. 
REP. NO. 91-1138, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in (19701 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. 
NEWS 5082, 5088. 
35. 447 US. at 319. 
36. Id. at 321. Contrary to the dissent's statement, exclusion of bacteria from the 
1970 Act did not exclude them from the "set of patentable organisms." The 1970 Act was 
not a patent law. S. REP. NO. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). 
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cause it is alive. The Supreme Court's opinion addressed the 
first but not the second queston. This Casenote will consider 
both these questions in light of certain facts the Supreme Court 
should have considered. The conclusion reached here is that 
even though the Court's holding was correct, its reasoning would 
have been more compelling if the Court had examined these 
facts and followed its own precedents more closely. 
The Court has previously given definitions to most of the 
four categories of patentable subject matter. One of these four 
categories is the "manufacture." Under the traditional defini- 
tion, a manufacture is an article produced "for use from raw or 
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qual- 
ities, properties, or corn bin at ion^."^^ In addition, this transfor- 
mation must be of a degree sufficient to give the invention "a 
distinctive name, character or use from that of [the original 
materials]."" In the instant case the Court quoted this tradi- 
tional definition8@ but did not directly apply it. Instead, the 
Court reasoned that because Chakrabarty's discovery was "not 
nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it [was] patentable 
subject matter under 9 101" as a manufa~ture.~~ The definition 
of manufacture, however, does not raise the issue of whether the 
materials used are products of nature: "All of the tangible things 
with which man deals and for which patent, protection is granted 
are products of nature in the sense that nature provides the ba- 
sic source materials.'"l Ore for metals, wood for lumber and sili- 
cates for glass are but three examples of natural products that 
man transforms into patentable inventions. By focusing on 
whether the bacteria were products of nature instead of whether 
the materials were sufficiently transformed under the traditional 
test for a manufacture, the Court unnecessarily departed from 
its earlier decisions and made an unwarranted alteration in the 
test for patentability. 
Chakrabarty's microorganisms presumably would have been 
held to be a manufacture under the traditional test. The raw 
materials used to produce the microorganisms were four types of 
plasmids and a strain of Pseudornonas aeruginosa, which is in- 
37. American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1930). 
38. Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887). 
39. 447 U.S. at 308. 
40. 447 U.S. at 310. See note 50 infra. 
41. Merck and Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir. 
1958). 
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capable of degrading hydrocarbons. Through genetic engineering 
Chakrabarty was able to transfer the plasmids into the host bac- 
teria.42 By this process he produced bacteria, which previously 
had no capability to degrade oil, with the capacity to degrade 
four different hydrocarbons. This strain of new and different 
bacteria had an increased usefulness as compared with the origi- 
nal, unmodified strain of naturally occurring bacteria. Therefore, 
the new bacteria complied with the traditional definition of 
manufacture. 
In other words, the Court could have reached its desired re- 
sult-allowing Chakrabarty's patent application-by merely fol- 
lowing its previously established tests. Instead the Court chose 
to reach that result by introducing a new test. In this sense the 
Court's action can be labeled unnecessary. Furthermore, the in- 
troduction of the new Chakrabarty test raises questions about 
the continued validity of some case law in the area of patents. 
One example of such a question is illustrated in American 
Fruit Growers, Inc. u. Brogdex Co.'" In this case, Brogdex Com- 
pany patented a method for the preparation of oranges for mar- 
ket by impregnating the orange rinds with a solution of borax 
sufficient to render them resistant to decay. American Fruit 
Growers, Inc. challenged the validity of that patent. Reasoning 
that borax-impregnated oranges were not found in nature, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the oranges could be 
classified as manufactures and upheld the patent." Under the 
test followed in Chakrabarty, a finding that the borax-impreg- 
nated oranges were not found in nature would have made them 
patentable under section 101. However, on appeal the Supreme 
Court held that this position was not tenable, adding that al- 
though a manufacture implied a change, not all changes are 
manufa~tures;~~ something more is ne~essary.'~ The Supreme 
Court in American Fruit was following the reasoning of one of 
its earlier cases, Hartranft v. Wiegmann," in which certain sea 
42. Patent Application of Ananda M. Chakrabarty (June 7, 1972), reprinted in Peti- 
tioner's Brief for Certiorari app., 40-77. 
43. 35 F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1929), rev'd, 283 U.S. 1 (1930). 
44. Id. at 108. "The complete article is not found in nature and is thus an article of 
manufacture." Id. Compare the Supreme Court's statement in the instant case that 
Chakrabarty's "discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is pat- 
entable subject matter under $ 101." 447 U.S. at 310. 
45. American Fruit Growers, Inc., v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1930). 
46. Id. at 12. 
47. 121 U.S. 609 (1886). 
7051 CASENOTES 713 
shells that had been cleaned by acid were held not to be manu- 
factures for purposes of an import duty. In adapting the 
Weigmann definition of a manufacture to patent law, the Amer- 
ican Fruit Court stated that to constitute a manufacture 
"[tlhere must be a transformation; a new and different article 
must emerge 'having a distinctive name, character or use.' "48 
Accordingly, the American Fruit Court held that a change in the 
oranges sufficient to make them manufactures had not occurred. 
They remained oranges "fit only for the same beneficial uses as 
theret~fore."~~ However, the oranges would have been held to be 
patentable under the Chakrabarty test because they were prod- 
ucts of human ingenuity that had characteristics markedly dif- 
ferent from those of oranges found in nature.'O 
A second category of patentable subject matter is composi- 
tions of matter. Such compositions have been defined as the 
mixture of two or more ingredients that may include "all com- 
posite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or 
of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders 
or solids.'"l In the instant case the Court adopted this defini- 
tion, but, as with the definition of a manufacture, did not di- 
rectly apply it. The Court instead determined that because the 
bacteria were not products of nature they could be considered 
combinations of matter? However, there was no need for the 
Court to focus on the "product of nature" distinction in finding 
the Chakrabarty bacteria to be compositions of matter. Under 
the traditional definition, the bacteria were certainly composi- 
tions of matter. They were a composition of two substances, the 
cell mass of the host bacteria and the four plasmids. The combi- 
48. 283 U.S. at 13 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. at 615). 
49. Id. at 12. 
50. The test the Court applied in Chakrabarty is set forth in 447 U.S. at 310. Before 
applying that test and holding that the bacteria were patentable, the Court quoted the 
American Fruit- Wiegmann test: "respondent's micro-organism plainly qualifies as pat- 
entable subject matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown phenomenon, but to a 
nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product of human inge- 
nuity 'having a distinctive name, character [and] use.' " Id. at 309-10 (citation omitted). 
However, the test the Court applied in Chakrabarty is set forth later in the opinion, 
after this unsupported conclusion. After contrasting the bacteria in Chakrabarty with 
those in Funk, the Court held that Chakrabarty had "produced a new bacterium with 
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential 
for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but his own, accordingly 
it is patentable subject mutter under 101." Id. at 310 (emphasis added). 
51. 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279,280 (D.D.C. 
1957)). 
52. 447 U.S. at 310. 
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nation of the cell mass and the plasmids resulted in a composite 
article. Thus, the traditional definition was met and the product 
of nature analysis was unnecessary. 
Even though an invention fits the literal definition of a 
manufacture or a composition of matter, it is not automatically 
entitled to patent protection. In Parker v. Flook," the Supreme 
Court stated that an invention that was merely the discovery of 
a law of nature could not be patented even if it met the other 
patent req~irements.~ This rule excludes, for example, phenom- 
ena of nature, mental processes and abstract intellectual con- 
cepts." However, it is important to note that the un- 
patentability of a discovery of a law of nature does not preclude 
the patentability of all products of nature. For example, natu- 
rally occurring chemical compounds have long been held to be 
patentable.'0 Since bacteria are composed of naturally occurring 
chemicals, it can be argued, bacteria should likewise be patenta- 
ble. However, a major difference exists between naturally occur- 
ring chemicals and naturally occurring bacteria; the bacteria are 
alive and the chemicals are not. For example, vitamin B-12 is a 
naturally occurring chemical, but it is not alive." On the other 
hand, the bacteria in Funk were products of nature that were 
alive." Because the only difference between naturally occurring 
chemicals and naturally occurring bacteria is the absence or 
presence of life, the effect of life on patentability becomes an 
important consideration. 
53. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
54. Id. at  589. 
The holding [in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)l that the discovery of 
that method [of converting binary-coded decimal numbers into pure binary 
numerals] could not be patented as a "process" forecloses a purely literal read- 
ing of § 101 [footnote omitted]. Reasoning that an algorithm, or mathematical 
formula is like a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law 
of nature cannot be the subject of a patent. 
Id. 
"Inventions which are literally one of the four categories mentioned in 8 101 are not 
patentable if they are also phenomena of nature because the public must not be deprived 
of any rights that it theretofore freely enjoyed." Id. at  583 n.15. 
55. Id. at  589. 
56. See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 
1958)(vitamin B-12); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), 
aff'd, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)(adrenalin); Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld 
Co., 179 F. 701 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 220 U.S. 622 (1910)(aspirin). 
57. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir. 
1958). 
58. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
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The Court addressed the issue of the effect of life on the 
patentability of bacteria only in the context of the plant Acts. 
The Court held that neither the 1930 nor 1970 plant Act re- 
solved the issue of whether the Chakrabarty bacteria are unpat- 
entable because they are alive. The persuasiveness of the 
Court's opinion could have been strengthened, however, by not- 
ing several facts. First, the history of the Plant Patent Act of 
1930 shows that Congress did not then consider whether living 
things in general were patentable." Secondly, it was not even 
the fact that plants were alive that caused Congress to believe 
plants were not patentable under the existing patent statute. 
Congress believed that because plants were products of nature 
they could not be "inventions"; for the same reason it believed 
their developers could not be "inventors" as defined in the pat- 
ent statute." Congress accordingly determined that plants were 
not patentable." To remove this obstacle Congress amended the 
patent statutes. Section 4884 of the Revised Statutes was 
amended to "avoid any doubt as to the scope of protection that 
a patent of this kind would give the patentee . . . because the 
word 'make' in the statute [was] usually understood to mean the 
construction by human activity whereas plants [were] repro- 
duced by growth."6a Section 4886, the core of the new legislation, 
59. The legislative history of the 1930 plant Act contains only two references to pat- 
ent protection for animals. Both are contained in short, offhand remarks, neither of 
which was the center of discmion at the time it was made. "[Col. Francis W. Parker] 
felt that some day the patent law would be amended so as to give the man who devel- 
oped new forms of plant or animal life an opportunity to control reproduction." Plant 
Patents: Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 
(1930)(letter from Edward A. Rumeley). "This is establishing a precedent to provide for 
a patent to those who develop a rare species of cattle or chickens." 72 CONG. REC. 8,391 
(1930) (remarks of Rep. Stafford). It is interesting to note that on April 1, 1969, an 
application for a patent on a chicken was filed in the Patent Office. In re Merat, 519 F.2d 
1390 (C.C.P.A. 1975). The patent examiner denied the application solely on the basis of 
section 101. The POBA affirmed, adding that there was also a violation of section 112, 
the description requirement. The CCPA m e d  solely on the basis of section 112 saying 
that the claims did "not particularly point out or distinctly claim the subject matter of 
appellant's invention" as required by 35 U.S.C. 5 112 (1976). Id. at 1391, 1396 (emphasis 
in original). 
60. Plant Patents: Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1930)(letter from Thomas E. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents); 
H.R. REP. NO. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1930). 
61. Patent Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2, S. 1042, S. 1377, S. 2164, S. 2597 Before 
the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., part 2, 790 (1968)(statement of Donald G. Daus). 
62. Plunt Patents: Hearings on H.R. 11372 Before the Comm. on Patents, 71st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1930)(letter from Thomas E. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents). 
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explicitly provided for plant ~atents.~'  Section 4888 was 
amended to remove the difficulty of describing plants "in such 
full, clear, concise and exact terms" as the patent law de- 
manded." Congress also added a section authorizing the Presi- 
dent to direct the Secretary of Agriculture to provide assistance 
to the Commissioner of Patents to facilitate the administration 
of the other provisions of the 1930 Act? 
The Supreme Court also found that the Plant Variety Pro- 
tection Act of 1970 did not preclude microorganisms from patent 
protection under 35 U.S.C. section 101. However, the Court 
failed to fully examine two important facts that would have 
more strongly supported this finding: (1) the 1970 Act was not a 
patent law, and ( 2 )  the 1970 Act protected only sexually repro- 
ducing plants. 
The Court incorrectly stated that the Plant Variety Protec- 
tion Act of 1970 extended patent protection to sexually repro- 
ducing plants.60 Although Congress contemplated extension of 
patent protection to sexually reproducing plants, it never took 
any action to enact such legislati~n.~~ Subsequently, Congress 
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, which re- 
quired the Department of Agriculture to issue "certificates of 
protection" for sexually reproducing plants.08 Thus, the 1970 Act 
provided protection "along the lines of or similar to [the protec- 
tion] under the patent law,"09 but it was not a patent law and it 
did not "alter protection currently available within the patent 
In addition, the 1970 Act was limited to sexually reproduc- 
ing plants; fungi, bacteria and first generation hybrids were spe- 
cifically excluded from its pr~tection.~' The Court postulated 
that Congress had made this specific exclusion for one or more 
of three possible reasons: (1) by 1970 artificial true-to-type re- 
production of sexually reproducing plants was possible, (2) bac- 
63. Id. at 6. 
64. Id. at 7. 
65. Id. at 1, 2, 6, 7. 
66. 447 U.S. at 313. "By 1970, however, it was recognized . . . that patent protection 
was . . . appropriate. The 1970 Act extended that protection." Id. 
67. S. REP. NO. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). 
68. 7 U.S.C. $8 2402-588 (1976). 
69. 116 CONG. REC. 40,296 (1970)(remarks of Rep. Kleppe). 
70. S. REP. NO. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). 
71. 7 U.S.C. 5 2402(a) (1976). 
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teria were not considered plants by courts of lawT2 or (3) the 
Patent Office had already issued patents on ba~teria.'~ However, 
the Court failed to note other facts that would have provided a 
sounder basis for the Court's conclusion that the 1970 Act did 
not affect the patentability of bacteria under the patent laws. 
Congress did indicate that it excluded hybrids because they have 
"built-in" prote~tion,'~ but did not indicate the reason for the 
exclusion of fungi and bacteria from the 1970 Act.75 The Court 
viewed this omission as a mere failure by Congress to focus on 
the particular issue before the Court. However, the Court failed 
to note the simple fact that the reproductive process of bacteria 
is asex~al.?~ Therefore, bacteria would have been excluded from 
the 1970 Act because they do not reproduce sexually. Moreover, 
the fact that bacteria are excluded from the 1970 Act-a non- 
patent law designed to protect only sexually reproducing 
plants-cannot bar the patentability of those bacteria under the 
patent statute. 
In addition to addressing the specific arguments advanced 
before the Court against the patenting of living things based on 
the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection 
Act of 1970, the Court should have addressed directly the basic, 
underlying argument that living things should be unpatentable 
because they are alive and that a patent on a living thing would 
be a patent on life itself. The Court implicitly rejected this argu- 
ment when it found that the Chakrabarty bacteria were patent- 
able despite the fact that they were alive, but the Court's rea- 
soning would have been clearer and more persuasive if it had 
addressed the problem directly. For example, the opinion's per- 
72. In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940). 
73. 447 U.S. at 314 & n.9. "Patents are granted on cultures [of bacteria]." S. REP. 
No. 932, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959)(letter from Robert C. Watson, Commissioner of 
Patents). The Patent Office also has a special classification for patents on bacteria. Class 
435 is titled "Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology." The title of subclass 243 
of class 435 is "Microorganisms Per Se, E.G., Protozoa, Etc." PATENT OFFICE, CLASSIFICA- 
TION MANUAL 435-4 (1979). 
74. A Bill to Provide Plant Variety Protection: Hearings Before the Patent Sub- 
comm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. part 2, 643 (1968)(statement of Floyd Ingersoll). 
75. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1605,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6,7; S. REP. NO. 91-1138, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [I9701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5082, 5088. 
There is some evidence that Congress has viewed bacteria and fungi as nearly synon- 
ymous: "The term 'fungus' means any non-chlorophyll-bearing thallophyte . . . as for 
example, . . . bacteria . . . . " 7 U.S.C. 3 136(k) (1976). 
76. W. KEETON, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 714 (2d ed. 1972). 
718 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
suasive strength could have been increased by making an impor- 
tant but elusive distinction: life and living things are not synon- 
ymous. Life is the label affixed to the set of properties that are 
unique to living things. Life is the "energy of function"77 within 
every living thing, the one component of a living thing that sepa- 
rates it from nonliving things." Life can also be said to be a 
product of a nature.lS Since life is something man cannot manu- 
facture, it is ~npatentable.~~ Life is, therefore, a unique, unpat- 
entable component of all living things. It is a principle of patent 
law, however, that "the invention set forth in a claim [must] be 
construed as a whole."81 The idea that a claim can be dissected 
and that a single unpatentable component of the claim can 
cause the entire claim to become unpatentable has been specifi- 
cally rejected." Thus, although the life component of a geneti- 
cally altered microorganism is not itself patentable, its presence 
in the microorganism cannot make the new microorganism as a 
whole unpatentable. 
Whether a live, genetically altered microorganism is patent- 
able subject matter under 35 U.S.C. section 101 is one of the 
most important decisions ever presented to a court. Unfortu- 
nately, rather than strengthening the traditional test for patent- 
ability to be applied to manufactures and compositions of mat- 
ter, the Court's decision unnecessarily altered the traditional 
test by focusing on a finding that the invention was not a prod- 
uct of nature. The Court could have strengthened and clarified 
the test by applying the traditional definitions of the categories 
of patentable subject matter more precisely and by examining 
more closely the legislative history of the plant Acts and the 
77. United States v. 24 Live Silver Black Foxes, 1 F.2d 933,933 (W.D. Wash. 1924). 
78. E. WILLSON, LIFE ON EARTH 8 (1973). 
79. "[WJe have no direct evidence concerning the origin of life. We cannot be sure 
how live did arise; we can only gather indirect evidence to show how it could have arisen 
and how it probably arose." W. KEETON, supra note 76, a t  692. 
80. Life is obviously not a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. It  might 
qualify as a process, "a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given re- 
sult," if the materials are food, water and other essentials for maintaining life, and the 
result produced is the living organism. However, the fatal argument against the patenta- 
bility of life is that life is not new. See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 
F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1958). 
81. I n  re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 
(1977). 
82. Id. See also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590, 593-94 (1977); Makay Radio & 
Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); Eibel Process Co. v. 
Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1923); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 
707, 729 (1880). 
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possible effect life as a component of the invention could have 
on patentability. Such an analysis would have made the Court's 
reasoning more forceful and would have given its decision the 
strong support of precedent and of the established principles of 
patent law. 
Brent J. Jensen 
